outlook.jp is a free email provider
outlook.jp is a consumer mailbox provider, so anyone can open an address there in a minute.
72 /100
Strong
Email authentication report card
What outlook.jp publishes in DNS to stop other people sending mail in its name, read record by record.
Can mail be forged as this domain?
Yes, a forgery is delivered
DMARC is set to p=none, which only asks for reports, so a receiver that honours what this domain publishes is not told to reject a message with it in the From header, and delivers it.
- Weak
SPF ~all
The record ends in ~all. Mail from a host outside the list is only marked, not rejected, so it usually still arrives.
- Weak
DMARC p=none
A DMARC record is published, but p=none only asks for reports. Receivers are told to deliver failing mail anyway, so this stops no forgery.
A checker that reports "DMARC found" here is telling you nothing useful.
- Weak
MTA-STS Not published
No MTA-STS policy, so a sending server has nothing that tells it to insist on verified TLS for this domain.
- Weak
DNSSEC Not signed
The zone is not signed. A resolver has no cryptographic way to tell a real answer from a forged one.
- Weak
TLS-RPT Not published
No reporting address, so failed TLS deliveries to this domain go unnoticed by its owner.
Why it scores 72?
- Accepts mail through 1 MX host.
- Mail is handled by a mailbox provider we recognize.
- No website answers on this domain.
What to publish to close the gaps
The records outlook.jp is missing, in the order they are worth doing. Owner names are written out in full, so they work whether your DNS panel wants a full name or a relative one.
Tighten SPF to -all
Nameoutlook.jpTypeTXTValuev=spf1 <your existing mechanisms> -allKeep the mechanisms you already have and change the final qualifier. Anything softer leaves the forgery path open.
Move DMARC off p=none
p=none blocks nothing. Once your reports show every legitimate sender passing, raise the policy to quarantine and then to reject.
Publish an MTA-STS policy
Name_mta-sts.outlook.jpTypeTXTValuev=STSv1; id=<a version string you bump on every change>Serve the policy body at https://mta-sts.outlook.jp/.well-known/mta-sts.txt, start it in testing mode, then switch it to enforce so senders refuse to deliver over an unverified connection.
Publish a TLS reporting address
Without it, a sending server that could not negotiate TLS with your mail hosts has nowhere to tell you.
Sign the zone with DNSSEC
Turn DNSSEC on with your DNS provider, then publish the DS record it hands you at your registrar. Every record above is only as trustworthy as the answer that carries it, and signing the zone is what makes the answers verifiable.
Questions about outlook.jp
Every answer below is generated from the stored record for this domain.
Is outlook.jp a disposable email domain?
Is outlook.jp spoofable?
Does outlook.jp publish SPF and DMARC?
Who handles email for outlook.jp?
How old is the outlook.jp domain?
How do I block outlook.jp on my signup form?
Can I trust email from outlook.jp?
Last verified . We recheck every domain on a schedule, and this report changes only when its records or its verdict do.