army.net cannot receive email
army.net cannot receive email at all.
76 /100
Strong
Email authentication report card
What army.net publishes in DNS to stop other people sending mail in its name, read record by record.
Can mail be forged as this domain?
Yes, a forgery is delivered
DMARC is set to p=none, which only asks for reports, so a receiver that honours what this domain publishes is not told to reject a message with it in the From header, and delivers it.
- Fail
SPF No record
No SPF record is published, so receivers have no list of hosts allowed to send as this domain.
- Weak
DMARC p=none
A DMARC record is published, but p=none only asks for reports. Receivers are told to deliver failing mail anyway, so this stops no forgery.
A checker that reports "DMARC found" here is telling you nothing useful.
- Weak
MTA-STS Not published
No MTA-STS policy, so a sending server has nothing that tells it to insist on verified TLS for this domain.
- Weak
DNSSEC Not signed
The zone is not signed. A resolver has no cryptographic way to tell a real answer from a forged one.
- Weak
TLS-RPT Not published
No reporting address, so failed TLS deliveries to this domain go unnoticed by its owner.
Why it scores 76?
- Registered more than five years ago.
- No MX record, but the domain resolves, so mail still reaches that host.
- No SPF record, so anyone can send as this domain.
What to publish to close the gaps
The records army.net is missing, in the order they are worth doing. Owner names are written out in full, so they work whether your DNS panel wants a full name or a relative one.
Publish an SPF record
Namearmy.netTypeTXTValuev=spf1 include:<your mail platform> -allList every platform that sends on your behalf, then end the record in -all so everything else fails.
Move DMARC off p=none
p=none blocks nothing. Once your reports show every legitimate sender passing, raise the policy to quarantine and then to reject.
Publish an MTA-STS policy
Name_mta-sts.army.netTypeTXTValuev=STSv1; id=<a version string you bump on every change>Serve the policy body at https://mta-sts.army.net/.well-known/mta-sts.txt, start it in testing mode, then switch it to enforce so senders refuse to deliver over an unverified connection.
Publish a TLS reporting address
Without it, a sending server that could not negotiate TLS with your mail hosts has nowhere to tell you.
Sign the zone with DNSSEC
Turn DNSSEC on with your DNS provider, then publish the DS record it hands you at your registrar. Every record above is only as trustworthy as the answer that carries it, and signing the zone is what makes the answers verifiable.
Questions about army.net
Every answer below is generated from the stored record for this domain.
Is army.net a disposable email domain?
Is army.net spoofable?
Does army.net publish SPF and DMARC?
Who handles email for army.net?
How old is the army.net domain?
How do I block army.net on my signup form?
Can I trust email from army.net?
Last verified . We recheck every domain on a schedule, and this report changes only when its records or its verdict do.